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Abstract:
We consider a partial equilibrium model where we study the integration of two oligopolistic markets
that are not symmetric (in number of ﬁrms, in demand or market dimension). We present a
simulation for the integration of the Iberian wholesale electricity market (MIBEL) and show how the
exercise of market power will evolve with regional full integration. The simulation results show that,
as expected, market power is lower after full integration. However, even after full integration,
market power is still a feature of the market. There fore, the full beneﬁts of liberalisation and
integration are not seized by the consumers since wholesale prices persist to be higher than
marginal costs.
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 1. Introduction 
One of the proclaimed aims of economic integration of the European Union (EU) is 
the liberalization and integration of national energy markets (for gas and electricity). 
After the first EU electricity directive that came into force in 1997, almost all European 
countries have already involved in the process of creating an Internal Electricity Market. 
Gradual integration of regional markets is a European Commission (EC) intermediate 
target to achieve greater integration since regional markets work as experimental fields 
to infer advantages and disadvantages of integration. Some examples of integrated 
regional markets in EU are the (first) Nord Pool (Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark) and MIBEL (Iberian Electricity Market), between Portugal and Spain. Given 
its specific characteristics, the MIBEL may be used to follow the EC purpose, namely 
studying pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of the integration of electricity 
markets. Moreover, the promotion of good governance in the market, according to free 
competition, is one of the main principles of the MIBEL protocol. Therefore, studying 
concerning questions in MIBEL will enable to learn from its experience and help the 
process to achieve the Single Electricity Market. 
While the benefits of the electricity sector reform have been substantial, the Report on 
Progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market (EC 2005, 2007) claimed 
that in most Member States a high level of concentration persisted in generation, which 
created a scope for market power from incumbent generators and significant efforts 
are still needed to create  a competitive common market for electricity (and energy in 
general). Thus, even a liberalized market for electricity is prone to the exercise of 
market power. 
According to the literature, the opening of any market to greater competition should 
deliver greater efficiency and, over the long term, lower market power than otherwise 
would be without competition. However, the structure of the market and the special 
features of electricity may mean that the benefits of integration may not be maximized. 
The major generation companies are large enough to be able to influence prices using 
their generation capacity and thus prevent the potential gains of integration to be fully 
realized. Therefore, it is important to study the evolution of electricity markets in Europe 
with respect to exercising market power in this regional integrated market and its 
influence on the advantages of restructuring. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the existing literature on market power 
and restructure of electricity markets by studying the integration of two oligopolistic 
markets that are not symmetric (in number of firms, in demand or market dimension). 
Our purpose is to discuss the achievement of all aims of full integration of electricity 
markets in Europe. The model applied in our research is a partial equilibrium one where 
the behaviour of generation firms after integration will be based on a Cournot model 
with a competitive fringe. Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), we compare 
simulated market outcomes on four days of 2004, with no integration and with full 
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 integration. Even though the literature has extensively explored the question of how 
integration affects the welfare properties of electricity markets, more results and 
conclusions on market performance and on the exercise of market power are needed 
under realistic assumptions and considering the special features of electricity markets. 
Our paper analyses the evolution of market outcomes and market shares from the 
Iberian integration and questions if market power will decrease, as expected, after 
integration and thus infers by how much it will decrease discussing who wins and who 
loses with the integration process. 
Our results show that market power, using the Lerner Index (LI) and the concentration 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), will be lower, or at least not higher, after integration, 
as expected, but the exercise of market power by electricity generators will still be a 
feature of   the market. A key finding is that larger firms might use market power in all 
periods (on peak and off peak). There is also market power on some off peak periods, 
surprisingly, where the LI assumes higher values. This is due to the presence of nuclear 
plants in the market that postpone the use of thermal plants, namely in periods of low 
demand. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the existing literature 
on market power analysis and present the paper approach. Section 3 describes the Iberian 
market MIBEL (Portugal and Spain), before and after integration. In section 4, we describe 
our model setup covering the specification of costs and demand.  Following we discuss 
the results of the simulation approach, with static and dynamic perspective. In section 6, 
we conclude and suggest pol icy implications and avenues for future research. 
 
2. Market power analysis 
A first question for the analysis of market power is the identification of the geographic 
scope of the market or the relevant market (Werden, 1996).  In our analysis, the relevant 
market is the Iberian Peninsula, considering absence of transmission constraints after 
integration (all the problems of interconnections are assumed to be solved) inside the 
Iberian market. 
The effects of market integration have been studied before, either in partial equilibrium 
literature or in general equilibrium literature. In either theoretical or empirical studies, 
there is a standard assumption that integration of markets will promote competition. 
In partial equilibrium, several literature was concerned with examining the relation 
between integration and market power of firms. Ishikawa (2004) refers to a model with 
a monopolis- tic firm producing for two markets and claims the existence of pro-
competitive effects of eco- nomic integration, under oligopoly (see also the static 
models of Venables (1990) and Venables (1990b)). Dynamic models can also be 
reported to study pro-competitive effects of integration (see Colonescu and Schmitt, 
2003, Fung, 1992 and Lommerud and Sørgard, 2001). 
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 Previous work assesses various aspects of an integrated electricity market in several 
countries based on a model on the existing generating infrastructure. The study by 
Berger et al. (1991) evaluates the cost savings from electricity trade in the American-
Canadian Northeast. The general approach is similar to Amundsen and Tjøtta (1997) 
but in the former research, they consider that demand is totally price inelastic and they 
apply linear programming to find the equilibrium solution in a long run model. Bergman 
and Andersson (1994) study a more complex conjectural variation model restricted to 
the Swedish electricity market. Amundsen et al. (1994) consider some Northern 
countries in their long run model in order to determine both transmission and generation 
capacity. 
Market power is one of the subjects that was most often studied in all markets and, in 
particular, on wholesale electricity markets. Several methods have been used in 
industrial organization to measure market power in electricity markets which basically 
involve the simulation of market outcomes using the available cost data and oligopoly 
equilibrium concepts. According to these models, market power is present when there is 
difference between oligopolistic price and competitive price. These models can be 
divided into either Cournot (simulation) approach or Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) 
approach. 
It is commonly accepted in the literature that Cournot quantity setting is not perfect to 
model reality in electricity market, but the existence of generation capacity constraints 
(at least during peak periods) in these markets and the presence of increasing marginal 
costs of producing electricity justify the choice. Another fact that justifies the use of this 
approach is the existence of a centralized price mechanism in electricity markets. The 
capacity constraints on generation are significant in both the medium term and the 
short term when plants are turned into "unavailable" due to maintenance or other 
reliability considerations. Short term constraints are more relevant in our study, since 
the capacity investment of the major players have already taken place. Therefore, 
Cournot competition seems to represent (fairly) realistically firm behavior in an 
electricity market where generators are competing with relatively "steep" marginal costs 
and where capacity constraints exist. There have been numerous studies of oligopoly 
behavior in restructured electricity market, which rely on the Cournot framework to infer 
market power. For the Californian wholesale market, Borenstein et al. (1996) and 
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) use a Cournot model with competitive fringe. The 
inefficiencies due to deregulation of the wholesale market was also studied in the same 
framework through the application of a Cournot model in Borenstein et al. (2002). The 
question of the impact of strategic hydro scheduling on market power may also be 
analyzed using this approach, as Bushnell (2000) did. Adding to the Californian 
market, also the Spanish market (Ocaña and Romero, 1997) and the Swedish market 
(Andersson and Bergman, 1995) were simulated with this approach. 
The alternative approach, the SFE, is based on the assumption that under uncertainty 
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 firms adopt supply functions1 as strategic variables rather than prices or quantities. 
The most important advantage of SFE approach is the better representation of firms’ 
behavior when they have to bid a single curve that will be applied to different demand 
states. However, the supply function model also has a weakness that may limit its 
usefulness particularly when applied to certain electricity markets: the inability to 
combine the model with detailed production costs data. Generally, the studies using 
SFE make use of stylized representations of generators costs to develop smooth 
continuous curves, because solving for supply curve equilibria requires relatively well-
behaved cost and revenue functions. Klemperer and Meyer (1989) have developed the 
first model using the SFE approach. Some of the most important literature in this vein 
is concerned with market power on wholesale spot market, particularly after 
deregulation in several different countries. Green and Newbery (1992) apply this 
approach to the British Electricity spot market, assuming a sectorial structure dominated 
by two firms and considering an affine demand function and linear marginal cost to 
construct the corresponding bid curves. It can be also found some attempts to 
overcome some disadvantages pointed out before, namely incorporating the role of a 
market for futures and/or forward contracts to mitigate market power in electricity 
markets (Newbery, 1998). 
The papers above show the flexibility of the Cournot simulation to study electricity 
markets. Moreover, in some markets, trade does not occur exclusively, or even primarily, 
through a supply function bid process. Bilateral trading of specified quantities is usual 
in many restructured markets as are in future markets and in different forms of spot 
markets. According to its features, SFE models are not well suited to markets where 
these situations happen or where competitive characteristics vary between different 
periods, as Bushnell (2000) pointed it2. 
In our analysis, the Cournot simulation approach seems to be more appropriate since 
(i) the role of marginal cost curves of each firm is very important (notice that one of our 
concerns is the accuracy on the assumptions about costs3), (ii) in MIBEL, firms will bid 
supply curves, but they are permitted to bid a different supply curve for each hour of 
the day and (iii) according to the features of each market and the expected evolution 
of the integrated market, the model should include the existence of a competitive 
fringe. Thus, the SFE approach is accurate in one important aspect of restructured 
electricity markets related with the rule of bidding, but it is not as flexible as the Cournot 
approach in incorporating other institutional aspects of the market. 
                                                     
1 In SFE models, firms compete by bidding supply functions that state the relationship between the price 
and the supply offered by a firm at that price. 
2 Additionally, the SFE approach does not feature well in markets where there is a competitive fringe. This 
is because supply function models are based on the assumption that the slope of the demand function 
does not vary across periods. The introduction of a significant price-taking fringe results in demand curves 
that are kinked at the points at which these constraints become binding. The slope of demand does not 
only change as demand increases, but this change is endogenous to the output decisions   of the strategic 
firms. 
3 We use detailed production data that lead to steep functions and do not assume smooth and well-
behaved cost curves that are not convenient for solving with a SFE approach. 
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3.  The market: Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL) 
Our paper focus on a specific market, the Iberian Electricity market (MIBEL). The 
constant trend of deregulation and integration of electricity markets in the last years is 
common to several parts of the world. This market is a good example of a larger trend 
of market integration all over the world since two mostly independent markets became 
a strongly integrated single market. 
The success of any integration process depends on the coordination between individual 
participants. MIBEL is a regional integration within Europe between two very different 
countries: Portugal and Spain. 
The liberalization of the Portuguese electricity market started in 1995, through a series 
of decree laws. The Portuguese wholesale and retail market was divided into two 
subsystems: Public Electric System (PES) and non-binding electric system (NBES). A 
special regime system (PRE) was also created for renewable energy sources and 
cogeneration, under which producers benefited from feed-in-tariffs with buy back 
obligation by the network operator. The PES was responsible for the majority of the 
electricity purchased in the market. The NBES was formed by independent generators 
and generators from the special regime and promotes supply to non- binding 
consumers.4 
In the beginning of the previous decade, Portugal was not an organized market in 
Portugal, i.e., the spot market or forward market or intra-daily market were inexistent 
and all the trans- actions were made through bilateral private contracts between 
generators and REN (National Electricity Grid). The prices for the PES were fixed by 
law (regulated tariffs), according to several criteria such as fuel prices and payments 
for CO2 emissions. 
Since 1999, by royal law, liberalisation and deregulation in generation and supply of 
electricity was established in Spain. Transmission was still regulated and dominated by 
REE (Red Eléctrica de España). In this system created with the liberalisation, 
generators sell electricity to a pool and the prices are set in a competitive bidding 
process. The structure of the market included the day ahead market, the intra-day 
market, the ancillary services market and physical bilateral contracts. 
The electricity sector in Portugal was, in 2004, dominated by the incumbent 
Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), with a production market share of approximately 62% 
of total Portuguese consumption. In Spain, the electricity market can be considered 
more competitive than in Portugal. Nevertheless, because of merger and acquisition 
transactions carried out in the 90’s, Endesa, the largest Spanish generator, had 
around 42% of all electricity generated in Spain. Together with Iberdrola and Union 
Fenosa, they had a market share of around 84%.  The Hirshman Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
                                                     
4 Non-binding consumers are consumers that, given the permission from the electricity regulator may 
freely choose their supplier. 
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 and Concentration Ratio of the three major firms (CR3) showed that concentration was 
higher in Portugal, compared with Spain. When considering the integrated market, the 
concentration level was lower, as expected, than within each country separately. 
In 2004, the total installed capacity in Portugal was, in 20104, dominated by the 
incumbent  
The prices of purchasing electricity have always been one of the main differences 
between Portugal and Spain. For values of December of 2004, prices in Spain were in 
average 20% lower than Portuguese prices. 
The convergence of the Portuguese and Spanish electrical systems was formally 
initiated with the signing of the "Protocol for collaboration between the Portuguese and 
Spanish Ad- ministrations for the formation of an Iberian Electricity Market", in 
November 2001. MIBEL and the market coupling between Portugal and Spain started 
in 2007 with one single exchange centralizing the spot power trading for the two 
countries, after several years of negotiations. 
With 29 million consumers and around 280 TWh of annual consumption, MIBEL 
became the 5th largest electricity market in the EU dominated by five business groups 
that control a high percentage of electricity generation and a number of smaller 
companies from the two countries, which may constitute a competitive fringe. 
 
4. Simulation for the MIBEL 
4.1 Oligopoly simulation model 
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) analysis of California’s power pool to infer 
market power after deregulation, we assess the exercise of market power after regional 
market integration. The electricity market is modelled at the level of the wholesale 
markets, as in Amundsen et al. (1994). Our main difference from Borenstein and 
Bushnell (1999) is that, in our model, the market size increases as both electricity 
markets integrate. The benefits of enlarging the geographical scope of power markets 
are, according to economic theory, increasing economic efficiency and lowering market 
concentration. 
The simulation will have, essentially, three steps as in a merger assessment. First, it is 
necessary to choose the nature of competitive interaction between the firms in both 
separate markets, before integration. According to the features of each oligopolistic 
market described above, we assume for Portugal a model of leadership with 
competitive fringe and for Spain, a Cournot model with competitive fringe.5  
                                                     
5 According to Scherer (1970, 164), a “Dominant firm price leadership occurs when an industry consists 
of one firm dominant on the customary sense of the word", i.e. controlling at least 50% of the total 
industry output — plus a competitive fringe of firms, each too small to have influence on price through its 
individual output decisions. Since EDP had, in 2004, more than 60% of the total electricity in Portugal 
and we infer from market information that the remaining firms do not have any ability to change prices 
with their actions or decisions the choice for     the model of a leader with a competitive fringe for 
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 As for the integrated market, the MIBEL, we assume also a Cournot model with a 
competitive fringe. After integration, we assume that only the five largest firms present 
in both markets behave strategically as Cournot competitors (Endesa, Iberdrola, Union 
Fenosa, EDP and Hidrocantábrico). All other producers (from both countries) are 
assumed to behave competitively and are modelled as a competitive fringe, taking 
market price as given. Secondly, we specify the demand function considering the 
available information on marginal costs and installed capacity for each firm. To calibrate 
the parameters of the model we use the specification for the demand function and 
substitute data on current wholesale prices and quantities into the model. Lastly, we 
determine prices and quantities before and after integration and identify the changes 
occurred with the integration process. 
We follow Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) by 
measuring market power by the difference between simulated oligopoly market prices 
and estimates of competitive prices. We compare four time periods in 2004 considering 
two cases: without integration (two separate markets) and with full integration.6 The 
equilibrium at the demand levels is determined for four Wednesdays: two in December 
(15th and 22nd) and two in June (16th and 30th).79 For each of these days, we chose 
market price and quantities for two representative hours: a peak demand hour and an 
off peak demand hour. Each day is traditionally divided in three periods: peak, mid-
peak and off peak. The definition of each period depends on the year’s season (summer 
or winter). The summer season is May through October and the winter season is 
January through April and November and December. Table 1 shows the definition for 
both countries of peak hour time and off-peak hour time. 
 
                                                     
Portugal is justified. In Spain, the four major firms have similar importance on production and installed 
capacity and the remaining firms with less than 5% of the market compose the competitive fringe.  Thus, 
the use of Cournot model with competitive fringe is appropr iate . 
6 The year chosen was 2004 because it was, according to hydrological conditions, the most recent year 
that could be considered as "normal" (not too dry or too wet). The choice of a normal hydrological year allows 
us to identify base case for comparison. However, the simulation conclusions may be extended to allow for 
years with different hydrological conditions. 
7 Wednesday is the weekday usually described in the generators’ reports as having typical features. The 
selection of the month was made to account for seasonal variations in availability of hydro generation 
capacity. 
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 The following table presents the real values for the market outcomes for both countries 
in the chosen days.8 
 
 
4.2.1 Specification of demand of electricity 
For the estimation of the electricity demand function, we assume an appropriate 
functional form considering each period anchor point and a price elasticity of 
demand.9 The functional forms specified for the electricity demand equations have 
mostly been the double logarithmic form and the linear form.10 
Following Green and Newbery (1992), we set the demand for electricity in each market 
with a constant elasticity demand function of the double log form, where Qt would 
represent the total demand, Pt the price and ǫt the own price elasticity of demand. The 
function is fully specified if the value of parameters at and ǫt are known, 
ln Qt = at − ǫt × ln Pt 
where we pre-set the price elasticity of demand and then determine the values of slope 
ǫ and at  according to real data of demanded quantities and market prices.  Therefore, 
at and ǫt are positive parameters determined by a calibration process.11 The slope 
parameter (ǫt) is calculated such that it equals the price elasticity at the demand level 
and the intercept at is calculated to fit the anchor-pair quantity- price. Both parameters 
are different, depending on the period analyzed. 
The chosen price elasticities are used to define the specification for demand functions 
on peak and on off peak times for the chosen days in 2004. Therefore, different 
                                                     
8 A more detailed description of the data may be supplied under request. 
9 Given that there is only one pair for each period, it is not possible to directly estimate the electricity 
demand function. 
10 The log-log form is more common since the parameter estimation measures elasticity directly, while linear  
form is preferred when the elasticities are not constant at all price   levels. 
 
11 The calibration process determines the parameters in such a manner that the market prices match 
market quantities for the given own price pre-set elasticities. 
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 demand specifications for each period considered are available for the simulation 
model. 
The demand for electricity has been the focus of numerous econometric studies and 
the price elasticity of electricity demand is one of the main concerns found. As in 
Andersson and Bergman (1995) and Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), we survey the 
previous European electricity markets results on price elasticity of electricity demand 
in order to choose the appropriate parameters in their demand specification. The wide 
interval (ranging from -1.0 to zero) reflects differences in the geographic regions 
examined, as well as considerable variation in data quality and statistical techniques. 
According to our knowledge, there is no available research on electricity demand for 
Portugal. Therefore, we decided to find a European country similar to Portugal 
concerning the dimension of the market (total consumption of electricity). According 
to these criteria, Portugal may be similar to Greece and Switzerland. In what concerns 
research on Greek electricity demand, we can find several results. However, the 
interval of estimates is, even in this case, large. The short run elasticity goes from -
0.51 to -0.21 and in the long run takes values on the interval -0.85 to -0.24.The range 
of price elasticities estimated in some of these studies is shown in Table 3. 
Due 
to the large variation of price-elasticities estimates available in the literature, the usual 
approach followed in the literature is to report the results of the model for different 
value of elasticities.  
For our research, we choose to pre-set the price elasticity for each country reflecting 
our survey of previous literature and the conclusions above. The values assumed, 
displayed in Table 4, are measured at the anchor points and in line with the 
widespread perception that electricity demand is not very sensitive to own price 
changes. 
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4.2.2 Firm’s  marginal costs 
The total cost of any good is the sum of all expenses to produce it. To generate 
electricity, a generation plant and fuel is needed. Consequently, the marginal cost of 
generation includes fuel consumption and operational and maintenance expenses. To 
estimate the marginal cost of production for each firm, we need data on all generation 
plants by source of generation. Transportation or distribution costs will not be included 
in the relevant costs, because the purpose is to study the wholesale market and we 
do not need to account for the costs in the distribution sector. 
An inverted L is the typical shape of the cost function of generators, with each step 
corresponding to a different fuel for generation. This means that generators have 
constant marginal costs up to the capacity constraints, where the costs increase very 
rapidly. 
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), three categories of generation plants must 
be considered, taking into account the specific generation mix of the firm: fossil fuel 
generation, nuclear generation and hydroelectric generation. This separation is 
essential to accurately determine generation marginal costs, since the treatment of 
marginal costs on each of them is different. We assume that marginal cost are the 
same as the average variable costs, and can be divided into costs of fuel and 
operational and maintenance (average) costs. 
The cost of fuel comprises the major component of the marginal cost of fossil fuel 
generation. Therefore, each firm’s marginal cost curve is specified using fuel prices 
for electricity production, efficiency rates of each fuel and heat rate of each fuel. 
To compute the marginal cost of each type of fuel we should add the operational and 
maintenance cost per KWh to the fuel cost. The cost of each KWh is divided in three 
components: fuel, operational and maintenance costs.  
Hydroelectric plants are considered, usually, as zero marginal cost facilities, due to 
their negligible amount. Another alternative assumption that can be considered is the 
also tradition- ally idea that hydro energy has an opportunity cost equal to the 
operating cost of the thermal power plant that replaces marginally in each period. We 
use the first assumption for simplicity purposes. 
The special regime generators (wind, solar generation and cogeneration) operate 
under a regulatory side agreement, thus it is always infra-marginal to the market. 
These facilities always operate when they physically can and the production is always 
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 acquired by the unique distributor. Consequently, we are not considering the 
generation from these utilities in our model. Moreover, special generation represented 
a small part of the supply in 2004 so this absence is not determinant for the market 
equilibrium. 
After calculating the marginal cost per source of generation, merit order will be 
assumed on generation plants for each generator. This means that the firm always 
starts using a source with lower marginal cost before a source with higher cost and 
that the firm does not start using a new source before reaching "full capacity" in the 
previous one. According to this assumption, we are able to construct the cost function 
of each firm only after determining output capacity for each fuel. 
The maximum output capacity must also be allocated to each firm that corresponds 
to the capacity constraint. Full capacity should be defined as less than the plant’s 
engineering capacity (maximum capacity) since it may not be possible to run the plant 
at that theoretical engineering capacity. Each plant, by generation source, has defined 
an outage rate (OR), which represents the probability of an outage in any given hour. 
We use the total outage rate for each type of plant, reported by the generators. 
Therefore, according to Borenstein et al. (2002), the capacity of each firm should be 
determined using the concept of effective capacity, re-rating the maximum capacity 
using an availability factor12 . 
Following this procedure, we finally achieve the usual steep marginal cost functions 
for each generation firm. 
 
4.3 Results and discussion 
We assume that arbitrage is possible in MIBELand that the system rules are set in 
order to provide the same advantages to all markets. Therefore, in our case, the price of 
electricity will essentially depend on firms’ marginal costs and generation capacities 
and on demand elasticity. In order to infer potential market power, we set two further 
assumptions: (i) marginal costs of the firms will not change with the integration; (ii) the 
demand function after integration will be the sum of the individual demand functions 
before integration for each country. Given the pre-set price elasticities of electricity 
demand, we simulate the market in order to analyze the exercise of market power in 
the Iberian Integrated market. The existence of capacity constraints does not allow also 
the usual method for solving a Cournot model. Therefore, in this case, Cournot 
equilibrium is iteratively estimated, determining profit maximization output for each 
generator under the assumption that the other competitors will not change their 
production level decisions. This will be repeated for each Cournot firm, until equilibrium 
is found. 
Due to the shape of the marginal cost of electricity generators, the residual demand 
                                                     
12 (1-OR): Effective Capacity = maximum capacity *(1-OR). 
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 has flat regions. Therefore, the marginal revenue curve related to the demand curve 
may have discontinuities. This may result in a multiple local maximum for the 
maximization problem.  To solve the problem we use different starting points for the 
iteration, that means starting the iteration with different firms being the first to set 
output, assuming the others produce nothing and redo all the iterative process, trying 
to find if this change in the starting point will lead    to different final solutions. If it 
changes, we should pick the solution that is most similar to the market data collected. 
If otherwise, the solution is not sensitive to that change and the equilibrium solution 
was found for the generated quantity of each firm and, therefore, for the market. 
Our results from the simulation model focus on two different perspectives for the own 
price elasticity on the demand function: static (short run) and incorporating some 
dynamic aspects (long run). 
 
4.3.1 Static perspective 
Effect on market outcomes 
 
In 2004 electricity prices in Portugal were set by law, and consequently the simulated 
outcomes (from the leadership with a competitive fringe model) do not match the real 
data. Even for the Spanish market, the model chosen leads to results above the real 
data. One of the main drawbacks of Cournot simulation models is that generators’ 
strategies are expressed in term of quantities and not in terms of supply curves. This 
implies that prices are determined only by demand functions and therefore these are 
extremely sensitive to the demand representation. One of the consequences of this 
sensitivity is that calculated prices tend to be higher than observed. As we focus on 
analytical results, this is not such a drawback. 
Table 5 shows the simulation results for the two scenarios, before and after 
integration, showing prices and outputs of the competitive solution, the Cournot 
solution and real price and quantity in each of the demand hours selected. 
Based on the comparison of the simulated values, we conclude that there will be a 
decrease in the wholesale price after integration in both on peak and off peak hours, 
as expected, regardless of the hydrogeneration conditions. For on peak hours the 
decrease on price seems to be higher than on off peak hours for both countries. This 
evolution was expected, because in a fully integrated market, a decrease in prices is 
forecasted, also due to the increase in the dimension of the market. To this fact should 
contribute the availability of more diversified and efficient (Spanish) firms. Another 
justification for this evolution of prices is the presence of more competition in the 
market and the role of imports as a limiting factor to the exercise of market power. 
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 Table 5 
 
 
As well as price decreasing when there is integration of markets, total production will 
be higher than the sum for the two markets before integration. Therefore, for 
consumers in both countries, there will be more electricity available for consumption, 
namely during peak hours. Table 6 shows the simulated values of generators’ market 
share, before and after integration. 
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 Table 6 
 
The largest firms get more advantages from integration since market shares always 
increase in all scenarios. For the smaller firms (fringe firms) we can see a decrease in 
the market share in all cases. Moreover, the new fringe of the Iberian market will have 
a lower market share compared with the one represented by the sum of the two 
separate fringes before integration. The most efficient firms may seize more benefits 
from the enlargement of the market. The smaller firms on the fringe seem to feel some 
detrimental effects from integration. The firm S3 also loses a higher percentage of 
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 market share with integration, namely in off peak hours. 
There is evidence that Portugal benefits most with the integration. Not only 
Portuguese consumers may benefit from the decrease on prices, if benefits pass on 
to the final market, but also the main incumbent firm, P1, is the generator that has a 
higher increase on the market share, compared with before integration. 
 
Effect on Market Power: LI and HHI 
The exercise of market power is evaluated by the LI. Table 7 shows the measure of 
exercise of market power, before and after integration. In addition, the table presents 
the HHI, which infers the differences on concentration level in the markets. 
 
Table 7 
 
 
Before integration, and for all scenarios, there is evidence of the exercise of market 
power in both countries and regardless of the hour considered.  Market power is higher 
in Portugal for the majority of cases and even in Spain for some scenarios; the LI 
assumes the value one. 
Our results confirm that market power is higher during high demand periods (on peak) 
than it is during low demand periods (off peak), except for June 30, a period of dry 
hydrological conditions. 
After integration, we can conclude that market power will be lower, as expected. The 
decrease is higher for off peak times, for both countries. However, for the integrated 
market, higher market power seems to persist in both periods, on peak and off peak 
period. 
Concentration measures may help to screen the potential exercise of market power. 
In our model, the evidence seems to confirm a relation between concentration and 
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 potential market power for most of the cases. Competition authorities in Europe regard 
any industry with an HHI of above 1800 as being concentrated. According to these 
criteria, Portugal, Spain and the MIBEL can be seen as having highly concentrated 
markets. Portugal is by far more concentrated than Spain. However, according to HHI 
there seems to exist also a huge improvement in concentration with the integration of 
markets, namely for on peak hours in both hydrological conditions and for both 
countries. 
 
4.3.2 Incorporating dynamic aspects 
In order to implicitly include some dynamic aspects in our model, we have considered 
also the analysis for long run (more elastic) demand functions for the four days 
chosen. The next three tables present these results. 
 
Effect on market outcomes 
The simulated market outcomes for the two scenarios, before and after integration, 
are described in Table 8. It shows prices and outputs of the competitive solution, the 
Cournot solution and real price and quantity in each of the demand hours selected. 
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 Table 7 
Market outcomes, Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Long run) 
 
Our results show that market price decreases and the quantity of electricity traded in 
the market also decreases after integration. Even when considering dynamic 
elements, the Portuguese consumers will benefit more from the integration of the 
Iberian market due to a higher decrease in prices, assuming that the effect on the 
wholesale market is passed on to consumers. This decrease is higher in periods of 
higher hydrological availability (December) for off peak hours and in dry months for on 
peak hours. The same description can be made for the evolution of total electricity 
available in the market.  
Table 9 presents the simulated values of the market share for each generator, before 
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 and after integration. The MIBEL improves the already important position of larger 
generators in the market. On one hand, for P1 the market share always increases, 
compared with before integration and in a higher proportion for on peak hours. On the 
other hand, one of the larger incumbents in generation in Spain (S2) before integration 
increases its market share more in off peak hours. 
Table 9 
Market shares: Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Long run) 
 
For the smaller firms, S3 and the fringe firms, the integrated market decreases their 
market shares. In this long run analysis, the generator whose market share increases 
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 most is still the Portuguese incumbent, namely for on peak periods. However, in the 
long run the variations in the market share are lower to all generators, except for the 
fringe firms.  
 
Effect on Market Power: LI and HHI 
To evaluate the exercise of market power before and after integration in a long run 
analysis, Table 10 presents the LI for each of the scenarios and the HHI. 
 
Table 10 
Lerner Index and HHI, Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Long run) 
 
Before integration, market power is higher in Portugal for on peak hours. For Spain, 
the conclusion about the higher value of market power on peak cannot be supported, 
in a long run perspective. Our explanation is that during low demand hours, lower cost 
generation units, such as nuclear power and hydrogeneration plants, satisfy a large 
fraction of demand so that the residual demand faced by the thermal plants is very 
small or perhaps even zero. As a result, the thermal plants are less likely to set the 
price.  The LI assumes higher values for off peak hours where nuclear and hydro 
plants are supplying the demand. Therefore, the competitive price corresponds to the 
marginal cost of nuclear plants. 
After integration, the conclusions about market power are different according to the 
period considered. In general, we can conclude that considering some dynamic 
aspects, namely the existence of exit and entrance in the market by assuming a more 
elastic demand function, it is that the exercise of market power on the integrated 
market will be higher. The values for the LI are higher in off peak than in peak hours, 
always in the integrated market. 
According to the HHI, there is an improvement in the concentration in the Iberian 
market. However, in our model, the integrated market still is highly concentrated, 
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 according to com- petition authorities’ criteria. Portugal is more concentrated than 
Spain before integration, as expected. After the integration of the Iberian electricity 
market the concentration diminishes, namely, for on peak hours for both countries and 
considering all hydrological conditions. 
As expected, in the long run perspective, market power is lower than in the short run, 
at least before integration. The unexpected result is the higher market power on off 
peak hours after integration. This is due to the presence of nuclear plants in the 
Spanish market and consequently on the MIBEL, after integration. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Market power in the wholesale market is one of the major concerns for electricity 
markets. Due to the particular characteristics of electricity markets, generation firms 
may have significant potential market power, namely the larger incumbent firms. 
To assess what will happen after integration of Iberian markets, this paper analyses 
how the Iberian electricity wholesale market would operate and the impact of this 
integration on electricity equilibrium prices and quantities, comparing them with the 
levels before integration and infers the likelihood of significant market power problems 
once the market is fully integrated, using the Lerner Index. 
We use real data on plant costs, capacities, an analytical model and quantitative 
simulations of generators’ behavior to simulate the competitive market for electricity, 
following integration. The most important result of this paper is the reduction of 
exercise of market power in the integrated market, as it was expected. 
Notwithstanding, the simulation shows that there is still evidence of incentives to raise 
prices above marginal cost, either on peak and off peak time, but it is lower than before 
the integration. 
The simulations suggest that, in the MIBEL, there will be an average mark up of 60% 
on the perfect competition price, dependent on the hour of the day. Despite the 
decrease on the Lerner Index, there is evidence of a high difference between price 
and marginal costs. This means that market power is still an important feature of the 
regional integrated market. 
The Iberian electricity market brings lower electricity prices, as expected, for both 
countries, and thus benefits electricity consumers, if we assume that the evolution in 
wholesale prices will pass through on to consumers. The Portuguese consumers are 
the ones that benefit the most with the integration. Moreover, it is also the Portuguese 
larger incumbent firm that benefits the most from integration, with the highest increase 
in market share. For the remaining smaller firms it seems that the effect of integration 
is to lose market share. 
The future avenues of research include extending the model to enable the analysis of 
shocks on the production capacity through time and the effects of these investment 
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 decisions on the exercise of market power.  
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